In the article The Danger of Equating Eternal Authority & Submission with Arian Heresy, posted by Owen Strachan on November 9, 2021, Strachan cites Augustine of Hippo in his response to Maximinus the Arian. For more about the purpose of this series, please see the introductory post.

This is an example of a citation of the so-called "Later Augustine." While it is true that a person's theology develops over time, and there are sometimes radical changes in the thought of a person, this historical maneuver requires argumentation and demonstration of such a change.

Augustine is a seminal figure in Christian theology, particularly in the West. His magisterial work titled On the Trinity is often seen as a gold standard of western orthodox trinitarianism. As such, it has commonly been appealed to as an example of the mature patristic testimony regarding the Trinity. In particular it has been used to refute ERAS.

Strachan, in citing the "Later Augustine" attempts to pit Augustine against himself, and implies that Augustine later in life –and therefore at a more mature stage of theological development– moved away from the Trinitarianism present in On the Trinity and now can be used as a support to prove that ERAS is not historically novel.

Because Augustine is such a key figure, we will approach this quote in two parts. This first entry we will look at the immediate context of the quote. In the next entry we will look at some key passages out of the rest of the treatise for the broader context.

Here is the quote in its expanded context.

3. You say, “If he regarded himself as indebted to his Father on account of the body in which he emptied himself, it is much more necessary that he always offer reverence and service to him who has begotten one so great and so good.” Whatever your carnal thoughts might be concerning the reverence and service of the Son to his Father, his Father is his God only insofar as he is born from the womb of his mother. I see that you do not understand how great is the equality of the Begetter and the Begotten in that generation. But however much God the Son obeys God the Father, is the nature of a human father and human son different, because the son obeys the father? It is something utterly intolerable on your part that you want to prove from the obedience of the Son a difference of nature between the Father and the Son. Moreover, it is one question whether the Father and the Son have one and the same substance; it is another question whether the Son obeys the Father. Meanwhile, let us not deny that he is a true Son, and he is in no way a true Son if his and the Father’s nature are not one and the same. State, then, that God the Father and God the Son have one and the same substance.

May the divine nature force you to admit what the divine nature has given to human nature. A human child obeys his parent from whom it was born as human, and yet it does not cease to be human by obeying. And if the child were not equally honored, but more honored, the parent would rejoice and not be envious; still the child would honor its parent, even though it was born, not a little one that would grow up with the coming of age, but one equal to its parent. If human parents could have begotten a child equal to them, they would undoubtedly have done so. Who then would dare to say, “Even the Omnipotent could not do this”? I even say that, if human parents could, they would beget a child greater and better than themselves, but nothing can be greater or better than God. Therefore, let us believe that his true Son is equal to him. But if you say, “The Father is greater than the Son because he is begotten of no one, but has begotten an equal,” I will immediately reply: The Father is not greater than the Son, precisely because he begot an equal, not an inferior. After all, who comes from whom is a question of origin; of what kind or how great he is is a question of equality. Hence, if true reasoning admits that the equal Son obeys his equal Father, we do not deny the obedience, but if you want to believe that he is inferior in nature by reason of this obedience, we forbid it. In no way would God the Father, in order to have the obedience of the only Son, want to deprive him of his nature.

4. That Christ was subject to his parents was not due to his divine majesty, but to his human age. You said, then, to no point, “If he was subject to the parents he created, how much the more was he subject to his Father who begot him as one so great and so good!” Here is your answer: If he was subject to his parents on account of his being a child, how much the more was he subject to God on account of his having the form of a man! He did not lose that form by death, but made it immortal. Why are you surprised that, even after the end of this world, he will be subject in it to him who has subjected all things to him? You say that the Son is subject to the Father, not on account of the form of the servant, but because the Father begot him as one so great and so good, that is, a great God, though inferior to God the Father. Here you disparage God the Father who either could not or would not beget his only Son as his equal, and you disparage the Son who, though the only Son of the Father, was not generated as his equal, but was born so perfect that he would never become, even by growing up, what he could not be by birth.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 315–317.
Original quote: 38 words
Words supplied prior to quote: 460
Words supplied following quote: 258

First, we see that there is a repeated use of the phrase "you say." This essay is actually a response to Maximinus and contains several quotes in which Augustine notes a statement that Maximinus made that he is responding to. This is particularly helpful because we are given a glimpse of the Arianism of Augustine's day through the quotes of Maximinus. In addition, it is important when a statement, such as the one that Strachan is quoted, is a response to something... to understand that thing to which it is a response. This antiphonal feature is not something one would understand from the quote which Strachan selected, nor does he disclose it.

Second, Augustine responds to Maximinus's charge here by noting that he accepts that Christ can be spoken of as begotten in two distinct ways. One in reference to is eternal generation from the Father, and one in reference to his temporal generation from his human mother. This is a vital distinction that is often overlooked or ignored by the EFS advocates. In Strachan's case particularly, he has argued in ways that imply that the Incarnation is irrelevant in these conversations, since "what is true of the Son in the incarnation is true of the Son before the incarnation." This statement was made in reference to the Son's obedience to the Father in a recent episode of Strachan's podcast.

Since I accept, reverence, and preach both generations of Christ—that from God the Father apart from time and that from his human mother in the fullness of time

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 314.

Third, Augustine continues to demonstrate that to posit any sort of fundamental difference between the Father and Son is injurious to the glory of God. His argument is that it is inconceivable to believe that the Father begets a Son who is somehow different than the Father. Such a difference between the Father and Son entails a different nature, and Augustine rhetorically provokes Maximinus to agree to the utter sameness between the Father and Son, which he sees as necessarily the view of the Council of Nicaea.

Consider then the magnitude of the evil in your denying that the Son, whom you admit was born out of the womb of the Father, has the same substance. You do grave injury to God, as if he could beget from his womb something different from himself. Do you not see that you believe God’s generation to be defective, that you preach it as monstrous, when you dare to say that a different nature has come forth from the womb of God? But if you shrink from this, as you ought, and reject it with us, then at last praise and hold with us the Council of Nicaea and homoousios.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 315.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for this discussion, we see Augustine build on the fact of Christ's double generation mentioned above. Countering the claim of Maximinus that the begetting of the Son by the Father entails the idea that the Father has an ontological primacy over the Son, he appeals to the double generation to demonstrate that this relationship of primacy applies to the Son in light of his human nature. Contrary to the ERAS error, Augustine is not arguing that the Son is subordinate or subject to the Father because of his eternal generation, rather he roots this subordination or subjection in the incarnation itself.

Look, I say that God the Son was born from God the Father apart from time. I have shown how he who is his Father is also his God on account of the human nature which he has assumed and in which he was born from the womb of his mother without intercourse with a human father.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 315.

Fifth, Strachan employs a bit of sleight of hand in this quote. As I mentioned above, there are several times in this essay where Maximinus's statements are provided by Augustine, who then responds to said quote. The immediate context of Strachan's truncated quote is damning for his use of it. In it Augustine recounts that Maximinus was arguing from the reality of Christ's obedience and subjection in the incarnation, to an idea that the Son must therefore be subject and obedient to the Father eternally. This is precisely the ERAS position. Recall how Strachan argued that the presence of obedience in the incarnate Christ indicated obedience in the preincarnate Son. In the dialog in question, the ERAS position is not presented by Augustine. Rather it is presented by Maximinus the Arian.

You say, “If he regarded himself as indebted to his Father on account of the body in which he emptied himself, it is much more necessary that he always offer reverence and service to him who has begotten one so great and so good.”

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 315.

To this Arian view, that the economic obedience of the Son in the incarnation entails eternal obedience of the Son apart from the incarnation, Augustine retorts that this relationship of obedience and fidelity to the Father is only proper of the Son in reference to his human nature.

Whatever your carnal thoughts might be concerning the reverence and service of the Son to his Father, his Father is his God only insofar as he is born from the womb of his mother.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 315.

It is in the context of these this statement, and in direct response to Maximinus presenting what is now called ERAS that Strachan's selected quote falls. Apart from this context it appears as though Augustine is arguing for eternal obedience not constituting a difference in natures. However in reality we see precisely the opposite.

Augustine goes on to argue against a hypothetical response from Maximinus. This response is more or less that the fact that the Father begets the Son eternally means that the Father is greater than the Son. To which Augustine explicitly denies the thesis that the Father has ontological primacy over the Son. This is a vital mistake that the ERAS advocates make in that they fail to recognize that the eternal relations of origin are precisely not eternal relations of dignity or primacy.

The Father is not greater than the Son, precisely because he begot an equal, not an inferior. After all, who comes from whom is a question of origin; of what kind or how great he is is a question of equality.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 316.

Sixth, as you may have noticed above, the beginning of the quoted sentence in Strachan's use is not actually the first word of the sentence in context. Instead we see that Strachan has omitted the word hence. This word is important, as it means that the statement following is a conclusion flowing from that which precedes it. So, it is in light of the Arian suggestion that the temporal relation of authority and submission entails an eternal relation of authority and submission that we see Augustine's response. So the question must be: What obedience is in view in the phrase "true reasoning admits the equal Son obeys his equal Father?" Strachan would have you believe that this is in reference to the eternal obedience of the Son to the Father. However, that cannot be since in context Augustine has denied the idea that the subjection of the Son to the Father has any reference to the preincarnate Christ, and is only proper to speak of in reference to the temporal generation from the womb of his mother (ie the incarnation). Instead, "this obedience" is a reference to the obedience of the incarnate Christ to his God. Augustine's argument is not that the presence of eternal obedience of the Son to the Father does not create an inferiority of nature. Rather, his argument is that the Son is not inferior by nature to the Father because of his obedience in the incarnation. That is why immediately after this quote (the next sentence within the same paragraph) he argues that the Father would not send the Son if that sending entailed a reduction in his full equality with the Father.

In no way would God the Father, in order to have the obedience of the only Son, want to deprive him of his nature.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 316.

Seventh, this line of argumentation continues as Augustine again responds to Maximinus by locating the Son's obedience in the incarnation.

If he was subject to his parents on account of his being a child, how much the more was he subject to God on account of his having the form of a man!

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 316.

Further, to reinforce the charge that ERAS represents a sort of Neo-Arian impulse, we observe that Augustine puts in the conceptual mouth of Maximinus that the Son is subordinate to the Father because of eternal generation, not because of the incarnation. We also observe that Augustine understands that the Arians were not denying that the Son is God, just that he is God in the same way that the Father is. These postulates are denied by Augustine and rightfully seen as injurious to both the Father and the Son.

You say that the Son is subject to the Father, not on account of the form of the servant, but because the Father begot him as one so great and so good, that is, a great God, though inferior to God the Father. Here you disparage God the Father who either could not or would not beget his only Son as his equal, and you disparage the Son who, though the only Son of the Father, was not generated as his equal, but was born so perfect that he would never become, even by growing up, what he could not be by birth.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 316–317.

I could continue, and we will explore some of the broader context in the next entry. However, I want to close with one last quote that demonstrates a repeated feature of ERAS florilegia. Often times an ERAS advocate will abscond with a quotation, and as demonstrated pull it out of context. Almost every time what we find is that the presuppositions and conclusions of the quoted author do not match with the presuppositions and the quotations of the ERAS advocate.

In this instance we have already seen that Strachan denies that the Incarnation introduces a meaningful new category in which to think about the Son's obedience. However, we can see it again when we observe Augustine's interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15:28. In the same blog post that this Augustine quote appears, Strachan argues that the subjection of the Son to the Father in 1 Corinthians 15:28 has at least some reference to the divine nature of Christ.

Augustine however specifical argues that this verse is a reference to the incarnate Son's future eternal reign as the eternally incarnate Son.

We say not only, as you suppose, that the body of the Son, that is, the human body, but also that the human spirit was subject to the Father. We understand that scripture said of him insofar as he became man, But when all things shall have been subjected to him, then even the Son himself will be subject to him who has subjected all things to him (1 Cor 15:28).

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 317.

He goes on later to argue that this verse in 1 Corinthians ought to understood in terms of Hebrews 2:8-9 in reference to the incarnation. He explicitly argues that the future subjection of the creation to Christ and then subsequent subjection of Christ to the Father is related only to his human nature, to the exclusion of his divine nature.

The words written to the Hebrews, We do not now see all things already subjected to him, but we have seen Jesus who has been made a little less than the angels in order that he might suffer death (Heb 2:8–9), ought to teach us how we should interpret the words written to the Corinthians, But when all things shall have been subjected to him. This was said of him insofar as he became man, not insofar as he is God.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 317. Emphasis mine

If the presuppositions of Augustine are different than Strachan's, and his conclusions are different than Strachan's, and is interpretation of a key text is different than Strachan's... then we ought to come to the conclusion that the quote which Strachan claims is functionally identical to his theology probably is not.

Lastly, I will conclude by simply pointing out that the conclusion of the section which Strachan quotes is as apt a response to the Arian trajectory of the ERAS position as any could come up with.

You wanted to prove by that testimony that he was inferior to his Father, not as man, but as God. But you have not proved it, as those with understanding see.

Roland J. Teske with Saint Augustine, Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, vol. 18, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 317.